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Where All the Counties Are 
Above Average
Human Service Agency Directors’
Perspectives on Welfare Reform
Ann Tickamyer, Julie White, Barry Tadlock, and Debra Henderson
Ohio University
When asked to rate their counties in progress toward welfare re-
form, the directors of human service agencies in Appalachian Ohio al-
most uniformly describe their county as “above average.”  This echo of
the fabled Lake Wobegon is from agency administrators in counties in
a remote rural region characterized by high poverty and unemployment
rates and low levels of economic and infrastructure development, an
area largely bypassed by the economic growth of the last decade of the
20th century.  How can we explain the nearly universal optimism about
the impact of welfare reform and its prospects expressed by these bu-
reaucrats, who are most responsible for its design and implementation?
This question appears especially puzzling for a region that has seen few
real benefits from economic expansion and that, by all objective indica-
tors, remains desperately poor and underdeveloped.
We examine the views of the 29 directors of human service agen-
cies in the rural Appalachian counties of southeastern Ohio.  The direc-
tors of these agencies are the principal agents of welfare reform, the of-
ficials who are charged with the design and implementation of the new
policies, and the individuals who ultimately will be held responsible for
its success or failure at the local level.  We contrast their perspectives
with that of the ideology and policy climate that drove the reorganiza-
tion of the welfare system and with the perspectives of the clients who
are the focus of the new policies.  This research is part of a larger multi-
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method, multiyear, multigroup study of the impact of welfare reform in
poor rural communities.  The results of this component show that
despite realistic assessment of the numerous barriers to success in
welfare-to-work programs, the reorganization of the way welfare is ad-
ministered has resulted in a largely positive, often enthusiastic, en-
dorsement.
BACKGROUND PERSPECTIVES
Elite Views of Welfare Reform
Current welfare policies are a legacy of the conservative attack on
the liberal welfare state that gained momentum in the Reagan era and
subsequently became entrenched in political discourse by the begin-
ning of the 1990s.  Although there had been a long history of elite dis-
sensus (Teles 1998), by the time of the Clinton administration, welfare
reform had became a bipartisan preoccupation, with only minor varia-
tion in the types of changes advocated across the political parties.  The
Clinton administration policy advisors found common ground with a
new Republican congressional majority to drastically alter the parame-
ters of the safety net.  The result was the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), the welfare
reform bill whose purpose was “to end welfare as we know it.”
This legislation did, in fact, put an end to long-standing entitlement
programs that guaranteed qualified recipients access to public assis-
tance.  Most notably, it marked the end of the primary program of cash
assistance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and sub-
stituted the more circumscribed Temporary Assistance for Needy Fam-
ilies (TANF).  The latter’s purpose was seen as temporary, limited, and
geared toward moving recipients toward self-sufficiency through for-
mal employment.  The legislation gave the states great flexibility in de-
signing and implementing their own welfare programs, but a primary
parameter was a 60-month lifetime maximum for receiving assistance.
Many states, including Ohio, designed programs that placed far lower
limits on eligibility, usually restricting it to two or three years.
The route to creating political consensus on the need for welfare re-
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form can be traced in the debates about causes, consequences, and
remedies for poverty that emerged from the perceived failure of War on
Poverty programs in the decades following their expansion.  Individual
incapacity, cultural deviance, or structural barriers were each identified
and hotly defended as the primary source of poverty and thus the most
appropriate target for public policy (Epstein 1997; Katz 1989, 1996;
Schram 1995; Teles 1998).  Foremost among the issues that figured
prominently in these debates was welfare dependency and its sources
(Gordon 1990; Handler and Hasenfeld 1997).  Increasingly, the welfare
system was redefined as the cause of poverty and dependency rather
than its remedy.  
The most influential of these attacks came from the right in a “war
on welfare” that reversed the logic of the War on Poverty by inverting
the causal link between poverty and welfare.  While liberal analysis
saw welfare programs as a necessary response to complex social prob-
lems, conservative analysts argued that the existence of welfare itself
created, sustained, and deepened poverty by providing disincentives to
work and to traditional nuclear family formation.  This, in turn, created
a rational calculus for dependency and antisocial behaviors, such as
nonmarital childbearing (Gilder 1981; Murray 1984).  These arguments
were incorporated into the Contract with America (Gingrich 1994, p.
67) to form a centerpiece in the drive to gain Republican control of
Congress and a blueprint for the campaign and future legislation.
The charge of dependency was not limited to conservative analysis.
Increasingly, researchers and policy analysts with liberal identification
also adopted welfare dependency as the principal problem of the wel-
fare system.  For example, Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood (1994)—
the primary architects of Clinton administration welfare policy—con-
flate poverty and dependency; they accept the conservative diagnosis of
the problem but substitute government programs to make work pay for
the free market and laissez-faire approaches advocated by the right
(Epstein 1997).  Even from the opposite end of the political spectrum,
feminist theorists also found fault with the welfare system for cultivat-
ing dependency among its recipients, although their diagnosis differed
markedly in the forms and sources of the problem.  They were particu-
larly vocal in arguing that the welfare system creates a system of public
patriarchy that substitutes impersonal, public control of women by the
state for the more direct private control of family and male kin
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(Abramovitz 1988; Brown 1981; Fraser 1990; Tickamyer 1995–1996).
In other words, welfare bureaucracies position clients in the role of de-
pendent (Ferguson 1984, p. 45).
Models of Public Policy: Carrot and Stick
The common thread that unites the different approaches is a model
of human behavior that assumes individual rationality as the basic
premise.  Programs are criticized for their failure to provide appropriate
incentives for valued behavior (labor force participation, traditional
family formation, avoidance of substance abuse) or sanctions for de-
viance from mainstream norms and values.  Thus, a conservative ana-
lyst such as Charles Murray (1984) pointed to the “moral hazards” of
welfare as the inducement for dependency.  The Contract with America
states that “incentives affect behavior . . . It’s time to change the incen-
tives and make responsible parenthood the norm and not the exception”
(Gingrich 1994, p. 75).  The claim that behavior is a product of a sim-
ple benefit calculation undergirds liberal prescriptions as well.  Bane
and Ellwood (1994) adopted a rational choice model that makes wel-
fare more desirable than work when work doesn’t pay.  The individual
in both approaches is a rational actor, calculating how to maximize op-
portunity, even in a system that supplies limited options.  If the incen-
tives are perverse, it is only reasonable that a rational actor will act ac-
cordingly.
This assumption of individual, economic rationality increasingly
was reflected in the criticisms of existing welfare provision and in the
specifics of reform proposals.  Although by no means the only assump-
tion and value embedded in these policies (others included the value of
free market mechanisms and traditional patriarchal family forms, re-
liance on private rather than public sectors, and distrust of centralized
government intervention), all politically viable welfare reform propos-
als called for changes that entailed a system of rewards for work and
self-sufficiency and punishment for dependency and deviance.  Wheth-
er emphasizing the carrot of making work pay and providing programs
to enhance employability or the stick of time limits and sanctions for
failure to adhere to social and program rules, norms, and values, reform
policies purported to embody a commitment to a behavioral model that
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focused on individual rationality and utility maximization (Tickamyer
et al. 2000).  
In the debates over welfare reform, discussion of structural imped-
iments and barriers was minimal.  Issues that had previously loomed
large in liberal analysis, such as discrimination, lack of access to edu-
cation, jobs, or opportunity, formed little part of the discussion and
were generally seen as secondary to issues of motivation and depen-
dency.  In other words, in the development of an elite consensus over
the shape of welfare reform, structural analysis was discarded in favor
of an individualized approach that emphasized character issues and in-
dividual choice.  The only structural barrier that was widely acknowl-
edged was the institutionalized welfare system itself.  Thus, it should
not be surprising that, in this environment, consideration of spatial vari-
ation in sources and consequences of poverty, welfare provisions, and
the impact of reform efforts was almost completely missing.  Poverty
and welfare dependency are typically viewed as urban problems and
analyzed in a national context.  Despite widespread rural poverty, and
unique barriers to successful implementation of welfare reform, rural
issues take back seat in research and policy analysis.  
Devolution and Barriers to Rural Welfare Reform
Although regional differences were largely ignored in policy de-
bates, devolution, the other key feature of reform, highlights such dif-
ferences.  Shifting responsibility for welfare reform programs from
federal to state and local jurisdictions was promoted as a means to
overcome the “one size fits all” federal policy.  This policy, it was ar-
gued, failed to recognize variation in social, political, and economic
circumstances and prevented creative experimentation and program in-
novation.  At least in theory, devolution from the federal to the state
level provides an opportunity to design policies and programs tailored
to the needs and capacities of local areas and that emphasize democrat-
ic input and local control and responsibility.  In practice, there is as yet
little evidence that specifically rural problems and needs have received
much sustained attention from either the federal or state governments.
This is particularly important given that local jurisdictions vary in their
capacity to implement welfare reform, and that devolution puts great
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strain on local capacity, requiring poor rural areas with limited re-
sources to design and implement programs to meet state and federal
mandates that do not recognize unique rural problems.  
Among these problems are severe deficits in resources, employ-
ment opportunities, infrastructure, social and human capital, leader-
ship, and political influence at more central levels of government.  The
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) points out that rural econo-
mies face many obstacles compared with urban economies in their po-
tential for creating job opportunities for welfare recipients.  Rural com-
munities lack the advantages of metropolitan areas that can attract new
investment; rural areas cannot achieve the same economies of scale in
delivering social services for education and training, child care and
transportation; and they generally lack access to capital and credit for
job creation.  Rural areas also have significant numbers of “working
poor”—people who are employed, but are working part-time or in low-
wage jobs that provide few, if any, benefits.  The contrast between ur-
ban and rural is always stark in these respects, but particularly in light
of the economy of the 1990s, in which many urban areas achieved his-
torically low unemployment rates.  It is therefore important to call at-
tention to the problems of infrastructure and unemployment that still
define much of the rural United States.
As a consequence of these structural features of the economy, rural
residents often face an underdeveloped infrastructure of support for
employment, even when there are jobs.  Everything from the difficulty
of travel in these areas to the absence of child care can be included as
obstacles to employment.  In light of this, we can expect that the impact
of welfare reform, and specifically of welfare-to-work programs will be
very different in rural and urban areas.  Similarly, the needs of welfare-
to-work participants will also differ, as will the capacities of human ser-
vice agencies to manage welfare reform.
THE SETTING AND THE STUDY: 
WELFARE REFORM IN APPALACHIAN OHIO
Data for this study are drawn primarily from in-depth, semistruc-
tured interviews with the 29 directors of Departments of Human Ser-
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vices (DHS) in Appalachian Ohio.  Interviews were conducted in
spring 1999, halfway into the 36-month eligibility window for Ohio re-
cipients of cash assistance.1 The research was designed to provide
qualitative data from each of the participating groups at the beginning
of reform and after initial eligibility expires in order to discover the
subjective meaning of these changes from both a bottom-up and a top-
down perspective, rather than imputing or imposing them from above
(Reinharz 1992; Schram 1995).  We also draw on results from an analy-
sis of focus groups of program participants in four counties selected for
more intensive study.  Details of the design of this component of the
study and its results are reported more extensively in Tickamyer et al.
(2000).  The contrast between the differing perspectives of actors with
different levels of power and responsibility are a central focus of this
chapter.
Ohio makes a particularly interesting arena for studying welfare re-
form because devolution was taken one step further, from the state to
the local level.  Under a plan called Ohio Works First (OWF), the state
adopted a 36-month lifetime limit for assistance and stringent work re-
quirements for program participants.  Responsibility for specific pro-
gram design and implementation was devolved to the counties.  Coun-
ty DHS directors are charged with applying reform policies in their
communities and have a significant amount of authority, latitude, and
flexibility in how they accomplish this task.  Their agencies are also
subject to sanctions if their counties are unable to meet state-imposed
goals when eligibility limits expire.  
Counties vary in the types of measures they have adopted, but even
more in their capacity to meet the requirements of reform measures.
Although most counties in the region share high levels of poverty, un-
employment, and remoteness from urban centers, there is a substantial
amount of variation in these measures of economic activity, and even
more in less tangible factors such as sources of local social and human
capital, economic development initiatives, and access to training and
educational resources.  Table 8.1 shows the poverty, unemployment,
and median household income for the 29-county area, using the most
recently available statistics at the time of data collection.  
The larger study from which this chapter is drawn focuses on four
“showcase” counties selected to represent areas that reflect different
levels of capacity to manage welfare reform, given both the economic
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Table 8.1  Poverty, Unemployment, and Median Household Income in











Adams 20.3 12.8 22,529
Athens 20.1 6.5 26,020
Belmont 15.7 5.9 26,337
Brown 12.1 7.7 31,324
Carroll 10.9 6.2 32,245
Clermont 7.1 4.6 40,689
Columbiana 14.0 6.3 30,139
Coshocton 11.9 7.7 29,308
Gallia 18.9 10.3 27,426
Guernsey 15.9 10.0 26,077
Harrison 15.9 8.0 24,444
Highland 12.9 5.7 27,201
Hocking 13.0 11.1 28,865
Holmes 10.6 3.3 31,786
Jackson 17.5 8.3 25,050
Jefferson 15.5 6.4 27,538
Lawrence 19.9 7.1 24,818
Meigs 21.4 14.9 23,558
Monroe 17.4 11.8 25,926
Morgan 15.7 18.3 26,458
Muskingum 14.2 8.6 29,079
Noble 14.5 12.1 27,190
Perry 16.0 10.2 26,899
Pike 19.5 11.4 26,814
Ross 15.1 6.1 30,750
Scioto 21.4 10.5 24,219
Tuscarawas 10.6 6.6 30,564
Vinton 19.1 17.1 24,530
Washington 12.3 6.7 31,127
Total 15.5 9.0 27,893
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conditions in the county and less tangible resources such as sources of
human and social capital available for county officials and agency per-
sonnel.  In this chapter, however, we analyze the interviews conducted
with all 29 of the DHS directors.  With the exception of the four coun-
ties selected for closer scrutiny in the case study, the interviews were
conducted by telephone by members of the project team and student as-
sistants.  In the four showcase counties, face-to-face interviews were
conducted by the principal investigator.  Interviews were tape recorded
with permission of the DHS directors.  Early in the research, equipment
failure resulted in several cases without usable tapes.  In each instance,
however, there were at least two persons present during the session,
each of whom wrote extensive notes almost immediately following the
interview.  
As public officials, DHS directors are not subject to the same
levels of protection of anonymity and confidentiality required and
desired for other populations in this study, but in requesting cooper-
ation, we indicated that we would make every effort to report results 
in a manner that would focus on larger aggregate trends rather than 
on identifiable individuals.  In general, directors were eager to assist 
in the project and to discuss their views.  In a number of cases, DHS
directors invited other staff to be present.  Interviews lasted for 
an hour, on average.  Interviews were professionally transcribed and
checked against the audio tapes.  Analysis is conducted via the use of
NUD*IST, a qualitative data analysis program and by standard induc-
tive approaches.
FINDINGS: VARIATIONS ON A POSITIVE THEME
On first examination, the views of the DHS directors appear to vary
widely; closer inspection reveals more similarity than difference, how-
ever.  In particular, DHS directors express positive views about welfare
reform in general and in their communities in particular.  Typical views
included a favorable overall attitude about the purpose and goals of
welfare reform, but not necessarily its outcomes.  There was also wide-
spread acknowledgment of the real problems facing both program par-
ticipants and their human service agencies.  These views combine two
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sets of explanations that are often characterized as contradictory in the
literature, but in this case represent a complex and multilayered under-
standing of the realities of poverty and welfare in their communities:
they attributed blame to individuals, which often reflected “culture of
poverty”2 explanations, and they also recognized the significant struc-
tural barriers particularly to poor rural counties and the region.  Finally,
they shared mixed views of the organizational mandates of welfare re-
form and the implications for their agencies, with general enthusiasm
reserved for potential and actual flexibility in program design and im-
plementation.  
We examine each of these in detail and compare these views with
those expressed by program participants.  Not surprisingly, we find a
very different orientation among the two groups.  We conclude with an
overview of how top and bottom perspectives provide different win-
dows on the prospects for successful welfare reform policy.
Attitudes about Welfare Reform
The DHS directors generally expressed positive views about wel-
fare reform.  In the 29 counties, only one director could be classified as
unsupportive, and it might be argued that this judgment is more a re-
flection of political views that favor a more drastic curtailment of wel-
fare than of disapproval of reform efforts per se.  This individual is very
much alone in both a strong expression of partisan ideology and in fail-
ure to express support for reform.  Another seven directors (24 percent)
could be classified as expressing some degree of skepticism about re-
form, but this was the dominant opinion for only two of these officials.
The other five combined skepticism with general support.  Support was
strong and unconditional among the remaining directors.
Typical comments about the positive aspects of welfare reform in-
clude large drops in caseloads; the opportunity to encourage a positive
work ethic, increase in self-esteem, and independence among recipi-
ents; reduction in public burden or responsibility and expense; the end
of what they termed “generational poverty”; and the opportunity to
generate public support for public assistance given that welfare is no
longer seen as an inducement to sloth and dependency in public opin-
ion.  The idea that public opinion is changing looms large in many of
the directors’ assessments:
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I think there’s a general perception, “[H]ey, you guys are finally
doing something right down there.”  You know, I think people
want to see the quid pro quo.  People are employable.  That we’re
getting ourselves and them off our butts and doing something
about it.  So yeah, I think there’s generally a positive impact from
the community.  
I think the American people . . . after all the bad publicity . . . 
[have a] very bad conception that all they do is stay at home and
make more babies . . . If you look at the facts . . . you know that
doesn’t hold true, but this whole vision . . . of our welfare pop-
ulation . . . became a political hot potato and obviously some-
thing had to be done and . . . they’ve come up with a workable
solution . . .
Negative comments mainly take the form of skepticism about the ulti-
mate success of the efforts and the political will of policymakers whose
support is necessary.
So what can happen—worse-case scenario—recession comes
along, our rolls go up, our money has been depleted or taken away
for education reform or other things, then, worse-case scenario,
welfare reform has failed . . . When it’s all said and done, if all
those worse-case scenario factors would come into play, we could
be in the same position we were three years ago. 
There was no apparent pattern in the degree of support among di-
rectors.  The only overtly oppositional view was expressed by a direc-
tor from one of the better-off counties.  The seven skeptics represented
some of the poorest and some of the more affluent counties.  Similarly,
directors’ backgrounds seem to matter little.  In part, this reflects lack of
variation in this population.  Although their education varies from little
more than a high school diploma to several with graduate work or de-
grees, in other respects they seem more similar than different.  They are
usually from the region and are long-time, often life-long, residents of
their communities.  They have worked in this or similar agencies for
many years and have numerous local attachments that give them deep
roots and civic prominence.  They are also white and, unlike their em-
ployees, predominantly male.  In general, this group of officials is lo-
cally oriented and somewhat insulated from experience beyond their
counties and the state of Ohio.
This combination of local boosterism and insularity was highly ev-
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ident in their response to the question of how their county is doing
compared with others, resulting in the broad assessment of “above av-
erage,” regardless of where their county stands on objective measures.
Ohio also is seen as doing better than other states.  These views are
widely held, despite a realistic assessment of the problems that face
their communities, agencies, and clients.
Problems of Welfare Reform
Favorable views about welfare reform do not preclude candid as-
sessment of the problems facing both recipients and their agencies.
Themes that emerge from their evaluations range across a broad array
of practical problems, including deficits in both individual characteris-
tics and local opportunity structure.  The former include numerous atti-
tude and character issues attributed to recipients, such as lack of work
ethic, lack of interest in education, substance abuse, domestic violence,
and passive acceptance of “generational poverty.”  
One of the challenges that we have with the hard-to-serve ones
which we currently have is basic skills such as personal hygiene,
working your full eight hours each day.  We’ve had people just
walk off the job without telling the supervisor where they’re going
or not reporting to work in the morning. 
Structural issues that were widely and repeatedly mentioned in-
clude inadequate transportation, child care, health care, poor education-
al facilities, and a general lack of infrastructure and economic develop-
ment.  The problems that emerge with greatest frequency are a
recognition of the serious transportation problems facing even the most
dedicated welfare-to-work participants and concerns about the quantity
and quality of jobs, especially if the economy were to falter. 
The problem now is do we have enough jobs?  Is the economy
gonna be strong?  Will it weaken or will it be [sic], if it does and
we go back down and lose a step or two because never in the his-
tory has the country been in better shape. 
These concerns are mentioned often both as stand-alone issues and as
particular vulnerabilities of rural location, political isolation, and re-
gional development issues.  
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This is a region in the state that needs economic development . . .
They need health care.  They need roads . . . I think we’re one of
the few counties that does not have a four-lane highway . . . I 
don’t think they really address the needs of the Appalachian area
when they come up with these policies . . . 
These views mirror the larger policy and academic debates about
individual, cultural, and structural approaches to explaining poverty
and welfare use, except that they are not held as alternative views or
“moral practices” (Hasenfeld 2000) but are held concurrently.  Recipi-
ents are blamed for lacking a work ethic, being “generationally” depen-
dent on welfare, suffering personal deficits in motivation and educa-
tion, and being victim and perpetrator of a variety of abuses from
substance abuse to domestic violence.  At the same time, directors are
quick to recognize strengths in their clients that surface in the face of
structural adversity, including lack of jobs and all the support services
necessary to maintain steady employment, from lack of transportation
to lack of teeth.  Virtually all variations on these themes can be found in
these interviews, most often simultaneously by the same individuals.
In other words, the same director will blame Appalachian culture both
for promoting and overcoming poverty and adversity, criticize recipi-
ents for their personal problems and simultaneously acknowledge
structural barriers. These are not seen as either/or phenomena but rather
are rolled into sometimes contradictory, generally more complex, mul-
tilayered views, as the comments below reveal.
They are facing many barriers be it education, drug or alcohol
abuse and it is quite costly to get ’em to the point where they are 
. . . employable.  One thing is the local job market.  What we’re
looking at, I really hate to say it, but what we’re looking is trans-
porting our people [out] of the county. 
And so we’ve got these essentially, I don’t want to say dysfunc-
tional, but sort of aberrant family patterns that have emerged, and
if we’re gonna get anywhere with that, then we need to get to some
of the root causes . . . We got the rural cultural orientation that we
have to do there, and I think that’s gonna take a real concerted ef-
fort to get it . . .
I think willingness to work has a lot do with opportunity, and I
think personal responsibility, I mean I think in general, . . . Ameri-
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ca’s, you know, sort of evolving this, “I don’t want to take respon-
sibility for myself, you caused my problem.”  I don’t think that’s
something that just goes along with poor people, so that could be a
social problem that we face in the broader scale . . . I don’t think
we had a real work ethic problem with a lot people.  I think what
we did, I mean, surviving is work when you’re poor.  Some of the
most industrious people I’ve ever met in my life have been on
public assistance or SSI, but they were very industrious about
keeping themselves and their family alive.  They just didn’t get
paid or recognize that as work.
I just know that in this particular part of the country, in Ap-
palachia, I know there’s been a real sense of folks taking care of
one another, and I don’t know about the extended family anymore. 
When DHS directors’ views are compared with those of the recipi-
ents they serve, there is a large discrepancy in the relative seriousness
of and frequency that certain problems are mentioned.  For example,
child care is critical in the minds of recipients (Tickamyer et al. 2000)
but is seen as much less important by DHS directors.  Although direc-
tors mention child care issues, they are more likely to think that this
problem is relatively easily solved as they increase efforts to train and
certify local child care providers.  Issues of quality and access to child
care are mentioned repeatedly by recipients but dismissed by most
directors or seen as exaggerations or rationalizations of compliance
failure.  
The use of sanctions ranks low on DHS director horizons; they per-
ceive that they are used judiciously and only after following elaborate
rules that guide their application.  Sanctions, however, loom large for
recipients, who are vocal in their resentment of a sanction system that
seems irrational, capricious, and personal.  Similarly, while both worry
about the lack of jobs that pay a living wage, recipients are more fo-
cused on managing what they see as competing responsibilities of car-
ing for children and other dependents than on employment.  Directors
dismiss these concerns as either failures to develop a realistic work eth-
ic or cultural aberrations associated with class and region.  
As a corollary, directors are much more concerned about immedi-
ate and long-term prospects of employment for welfare recipients than
the recipients themselves; recipients want to work but are more likely
to worry about the necessary tradeoffs, such as their families’ safety.  In
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some cases, they have traded jobs in urban areas for their child’s secu-
rity in smaller rural communities.  Directors worry about the economy;
recipients darkly predict dire consequences for law and order, child
custody, and their own fates should a recession occur (Tickamyer et al.
2000).  A couple of directors echo recipient predictions of social prob-
lems and unrest in the event of economic downturn, but these are the
exceptions, and even among these, concerns focus more on problems
for administrators (security of the agency and increased caseloads for
agencies and courts) rather than recipients.  Only transportation prob-
lems are accorded equal levels of concern by both groups.
The Bottom 20 Percent
The means by which directors reconcile their seemingly contradic-
tory views appear to be through making sharp distinctions among the
clients that they serve.  Teles (1998, pp. 183–184) divides the welfare
universe into five groups: “those receiving aid while working off the
books; those eligible for aid but not receiving it; those who are ‘job
ready’ and using welfare on a very temporary basis; those with poor
work histories but capable of training for low-wage jobs; and those
who are dysfunctional for physical, mental, psychological, or emotion-
al reasons.”  Welfare-to-work programs can have a substantial impact
on members of the first three groups, providing means to find employ-
ment under current economic conditions.  It is only the last two groups
that require massive effort and investment of time and resources, with
little prospect of success in a purely market economy.  
Although few DHS directors apply such fine distinctions to their
clients, they de facto adopt this view in their assessment of welfare re-
form prospects.  Their analysis tends to distinguish program partici-
pants into those who really only need some form of temporary assis-
tance—whether it is job training, transportation, or health care
assistance—and a smaller group of more problem-prone individuals
who have serious physical, mental, or family barriers to finding and
keeping jobs.  As one director elaborates,
[A]nd some of those are just, you know, just had bad luck and are
ready and . . . need assistance, and we try to assist them into get-
ting them jobs and so forth.  But there are those ones who . . . just
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don’t want to work . . . Mama and dad didn’t do it and so I’m not
going to do it.  It’s habit that they have formed in their . . .
lifestyles. 
Similarly,
So, I think because some of the people, especially the few that we
have left on are kind of generational welfare and that’s exactly the
people we have left on pretty much, people that their parents were
on and . . . the system’s always been there for ’em and now we’re
saying you need to become self-sufficient, you need to work and
we’ll give you the supporting services.  It’s not a message that
some of these people want to hear. 
We’re always going to have that group . . . the 20 percent that just
aren’t going to be successful . . .
By law, 20 percent of the welfare population can be exempted from
federal and state mandates that the majority of welfare recipients leave
the rolls by the end of the 36-month eligibility period, backed up with
the threat of  sanctions if this quota is not met.  This analysis has the ef-
fect of diminishing the significance of real structural barriers and ele-
vating an explanation that stresses the importance of individual failure
as the ultimate source of problems.  This has the somewhat paradoxical
effect of providing issues that directors feel more able to influence and,
simultaneously, a built-in excuse for failure if their best efforts do not
work.  Even directors who are most aware of the lack of living-wage
jobs, the poor prospects for economic development, and the failures of
infrastructure and institution-building in their communities resort to a
moral analysis that emphasizes the individual’s personal problems by
differentiating between the potentially successful versus the bottom 20
percent.  
“Lead Them by the Hand”
In many cases, the focus on individuals is expressed in highly pa-
ternalistic images that reflect concern with the depth of problems that
remain in the welfare population.  One director states, 
[I]t’s just the folks that we’re dealing with now, many, many barri-
ers.  They don’t know how to get out of it themselves so you have
to lead them by the hand to get through these issues and work
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them one at a time . . . it’s almost like taking a small child and try-
ing to teach it how to walk or talk . . .
The analogy to rearing children was elaborated by another director:
This kind of intervention we’ve seen over and over again if you
have the patience and the understanding . . . it’s kind of like rais-
ing your children.  I don’t mean to be derogatory about that, but
you don’t just tell your children to do this and they do it right from
that point, that’s constantly overseeing them and reminding them
and encouraging them . . .
Others provide elaborate anecdotes that illustrate the same perspec-
tive.  Rather than invoking the simplified rational choice model favored
by policymakers, directors adopt an alternative model that accepts the
premise of requiring personal responsibility on the part of recipients,
while believing in the necessity of significant interventions before such
responsibility can be expected.  Their view leads them to assume re-
sponsibility for intensive intervention to manage clients who are not
fully able to take responsibility for themselves.  
Organizational Changes
The key to DHS directors’ views lies more in their response to or-
ganizational changes and mandates of welfare reform than in their as-
sessment of prospects for success or failure among clients and program
participants.  Perhaps not surprisingly for administrators of large agen-
cies (which vary from fewer than 50 employees to close to 200), their
concerns are much more focused on how welfare reform is organized,
managed, and implemented than on the clientele that it serves.  Both in
spontaneous remarks and in response to interview questions, directors
were most likely to raise issues that affect their organizations, their
jobs, and their resources.  
A consistent theme is the changing nature of the tasks confronting
the agencies and their personnel: 
We need to go far beyond simply determine eligibility and, and sit-
ting down and taking re-applications from the individuals. 
[W]e went from an agency that gave services based on income el-
igibility to helping people become self-sufficient through other
means.  So it was like a total change for not only our recipients but
for our staff, too. 
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[Y]ou know, you’re more of a social worker now and you don’t re-
ally focus so much on getting a person a check . . . but you’re do-
ing a lot of this other hand-holding and mentoring with the people. 
Flexibility
Although numerous sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction were
mentioned by directors, the strongest and most consistent theme run-
ning through the interviews was the idea that welfare reform provides
increased flexibility for them and their agencies.  This was expressed in
a variety of ways, from describing particular program innovations that
they had implemented to larger philosophical statements about the
changing nature of the agencies, the new ways they would have to
serve clients, and the new populations they might serve.  Directors
praised the end of a “cookie cutter approach” and were particularly en-
thusiastic about the reduction of rule-oriented procedures.
We went from a system that was so totally irrational, it was a sys-
tem of dotting i’s and crossing t’s and filling out forms without any
real regard to what the end game was, what we really wanted to
accomplish, and that was to help people become independent. 
[W]hat I think welfare reform was all about [is] when we started
talking about devolving and bringing the programs back to the lo-
cal level and letting the local communities be responsible to iden-
tify what the needs are and how we go about addressing those
needs.  One of the greatest barriers before welfare reform, and one
of the greatest reasons that I think brought us to the need to reform
welfare, was what I call mid-level bureaucracy.  You know, 
you have the federal bureaucracy or national bureaucracy, and 
you have the state-level bureaucracy, and then you have the local
bureaucracy, who actually implements or administering the pro-
gram.  In the past, we had 75,000 paragraphs of rules and regula-
tions and interpretations, and these things always came out of that
mid-level . . .
Flexibility brings its own problems, however:
But, my biggest problem is . . . I know that there’s all these things
out there that all these counties are doing, and you know the coun-
ty flexibility is great, but trying to keep up with what everybody
else is doing . . . and what’s working for them. 
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Funds
Flexibility also went hand in hand with increased resources and
greater ability to spend money when deemed necessary, especially to
find the funds to create new programs and approaches.  
For probably the first time in the nine years that I’ve been here . . .
we have the adequate funding to do what we need. 
We went from never being able to spend money on much anything
. . . so now they’re saying spend all you want, if you need more
call us, we’ll get it to ya . . . I think that’s the hardest thing for me.
I still want to pinch pennies and I don’t need to anymore.  
[T]his year we chose to have consolidated allocations . . . and
we’ll choose what meets the needs of our community best and
we’ll spend the money which every way we feel we need to rather
than having this little tiny pots of money everywhere and having
to meet the criteria to each one that’s attached to each one of those
pots.
Somewhat to our surprise, with one or two exceptions, directors
stated that amount of money was no problem, even though they gener-
ally pointed out that the reform effort and the mandate to move recipi-
ents into employment was more expensive in both the short and long
run. 
[I]f the taxpayer actually knew what we were trying to do . . . they
would be appalled at the . . . actual expense . . . versus just leaving
clients sit on public assistance.  
Using the money was sometimes seen as problematic, however.  
I guess the big problem we’ve had here is cash flow because we
have to spend the money before we get the money. 
Sanctions
It is in this area, sanctions, that the most interesting parallels can be
found between DHS directors and program participants.  In particular,
directors express some of the same fears of sanctions as recipients, 
but directors’ fears center on the apparent irrationality of sanctions.
Thus, directors worry about meeting state numerical goals or quotas or
the economic sanctions that will result if they are unable to meet ex-
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pectations, and they often view the state as an irrationally organized, or
disorganized, bureaucracy that they must successfully negotiate in or-
der to run their own agencies.  
[T]he drawback is . . . the sanctions.  What if we can’t meet all
these participation rates or all the requirements that we have to.
Any sort of a sanction against a small county like mine would ba-
sically bankrupt us. 
[A]nd of course if you don’t meet the goal as a state, you get sanc-
tioned from the federal government, which amounts to having
money withdrawn, and the state, of course, would turn around and
probably—this hasn’t happened yet—but probably what they’ll do
is they’ll look for counties who a have low—lower than 90 per-
cent—participation rate and spread the sanction across those
counties . . . And, you know, we’re kind of at a disadvantage 
down here ’cause I think our last unemployment figure was 11
percent.
The difference is that the directors understand the sanction system and
what they must do to avoid them.  Recipients do not, a circumstance
that is understood by only a very few directors:
I see that the clients don’t really understand fully the impact of
time limits, nor do they really fully understand the fact that they
need to take responsibility for the position that they’re in at this
point and time, and they end up wanting to blame the, you know,
the agencies or the systems for why they are being punished or
sanctioned. 
CONCLUSION: IT TAKES A COMMUNITY
Directors of human service agencies responsible for implementing
welfare reform share the values that drove the reform effort, but they do
not fully subscribe to the underlying behavioral model.  Rather, they
substitute an interventionist and paternalistic approach that emphasizes
the need for their services.  Like both the elites who created the policy
and the recipients whose lives are its ultimate test, they accept the val-
ues of work, personal responsibility, and family values.  They agree
with the impulse that carried reform legislation to its successful pas-
Chapter 8 251
sage.  They endorse the idea that the old system was broken.  However,
their analyses of the reasons for failure are more complex and, hence,
so are their views on the prospects for success.  They generally reject
simple, polarized models of individual responsibility versus structural
impediments.  They are well aware of many of the barriers their clients
face, and they are often deeply pessimistic about long-range prospects
given their rural location, lack of jobs, lack of infrastructure, and lack
of political interest on the part of policymakers to address these issues.  
This knowledge is contradicted by their actions, however, which
are oriented toward fixing the individual problems that clients face.  Di-
rectors are all too aware that they are dealing with a larger structural is-
sue, endemic to the region, but it is beyond their power to do anything
at this level.  Thus, they are constrained to addressing even large-scale
structural problems on an individual basis, case by case.  For example,
the large and pervasive problem of transportation that affects virtually
every county and most program participants can only be addressed by
band-aid interventions of small loans for vehicle purchase or repair, or
by providing temporary or emergency taxi and shuttle services.  Inter-
ventions are designed to make participants “work ready.”  Much of it is
focused on instilling work discipline, from knowing how to get up on
time to proper dress and hygiene.  In the worst case, the most that the
agency can do is threaten and sanction with little backup assistance.
Directors’ hands are tied in this respect.  They can institute individual
interventions more so than structural changes. 
Perhaps because of their awareness of the real restrictions on their
ability to make meaningful changes at a structural level, or perhaps be-
cause they are administrators whose interest centers on the operation of
their organizations, they reserve their greatest enthusiasm for the ex-
panded opportunities and material benefits that have accrued to their
organizations as the result of reform.  They particularly relish the in-
creased flexibility, autonomy, and material resources.  They appreciate
the loosening of bureaucratic rules, and it may be argued that the great-
est benefit they perceive is a reduction in state paternalism governing
their operation.  In bringing devolution to the counties, the state has
given them a freer environment to design programs and use resources
in a manner that seems meaningful to the directors.
Ironically, at the same time that directors have experienced expand-
ed authority and autonomy, the same cannot be said of program partic-
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ipants.  Directors appear unaware that the same oppressive bureaucrat-
ic structures, rules, regulations, and red tape that they resent are, in the
opinion of program participants, applied with increasing pressure and
lack of clear purpose.  Program participants lack understanding of the
parameters of welfare reform and particularly fail to see the logic of
sanctions (Tickamyer et al. 2000).  They perceive these as capricious
and irrational obstacles in much the same way that overly regulated,
overly rule-oriented bureaucratic policies appear to the directors.  The
larger policy calls on recipients to take responsibility for their lives, to
move away from a system of dependency to one of self-sufficiency, yet
programs are designed in a highly paternalistic fashion, and the general
assumption is that clients are incapable of making judgments or deci-
sions for themselves; instead, interventions must be designed to “lead
them by the hand.”  Although agencies will work intensively with
clients to deal with their problems, it does not occur to directors to so-
licit participant views or to include them in planning efforts for design-
ing and implementing reform programs.
Interestingly enough, many directors do recognize that successful
welfare reform must be a community-wide effort.  They discuss the re-
sponsibilities of county officials, local employers, and the public at
large.  They speak proudly of mobilizing their communities in the plan-
ning process in the first stage of their efforts.  They know there are few
quick fixes, and although they are optimistic and appreciative of some
of the aspects of welfare reform, they are realistic enough to know that
the larger issues take a community effort, at the very least.
What’s gonna be the solution to their problem a year from now
when cash benefits go away? . . . I guess I’d like to see a little 
more fire in the belly and aggressiveness out in the community,
and I’m trying to instigate that . . . I think that just increasing the
awareness of the public that this is a long-term problem, not a lit-
tle three-year fix, and we all got to pull together to get something
done about it . . . It really does take a community strategy to take
care of each other . . .
What they have yet to fully incorporate into their thinking is that
recipients are part of the community, and their input and cooperation
are also required.  
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Notes
This research was supported by grants from the Joyce Foundation, the National Re-
search Initiative of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Ohio University.  We are
grateful for the assistance of all parties involved in this research.  All opinions ex-
pressed are our own.
1. The interviews are one phase of a multiyear, case comparative study of devolution
and welfare reform in poor rural counties of Appalachian Ohio.  In subsequent de-
velopments, the agencies reported in this research have been reorganized and re-
named to include job and family services.  Other components of the study include
existing statistics and primary data collection from focus groups, surveys, and in-
depth interviews with employers, human service agency personnel, and local deci-
sion-makers.
2. Greatly simplified, the culture of poverty assumes that the poor become purveyors
of deviant values, attitudes, and behaviors that perpetuate their poverty.  This “cul-
ture of poverty” differs from the mainstream and is transmitted intergenerationally.
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